The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for computing equilibria of two classes of static stochastic convex games complicated by a parametric misspecification, a natural concern in the control of large-scale networked engineered system. In both schemes, players learn the equilibrium strategy while resolving the misspecification: 1) Monotone stochastic Nash games: We present a set of coupled stochastic approximation schemes distributed across agents in which the first scheme updates each agent's strategy via a projected (stochastic) gradient step, whereas the second scheme updates every agent's belief regarding its misspecified parameter using an independently specified learning problem. We proceed to show that the produced sequences converge in an almost sure sense to the true equilibrium strategy and the true parameter, respectively. Surprisingly, convergence in the equilibrium strategy achieves the optimal rate of convergence in a mean-squared sense with a quantifiable degradation in the rate constant; 2) Stochastic Nash-Cournot games with unobservable aggregate output: We refine 1) to a Cournot setting where we assume that the tuple of strategies is unobservable while payoff functions and strategy sets are public knowledge through a common knowledge assumption. By utilizing observations of noisecorrupted prices, iterative fixed-point schemes are developed, allowing for simultaneously learning the equilibrium strategies and the misspecified parameter in an almost sure sense.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N NETWORKED engineered systems, a common challenge lies in designing distributed control architectures that ensure the satisfaction of a system-wide criterion in environments complicated by nonlinearity, uncertainty, and dynamics. Such control-theoretic problems take on a variety of forms and arise in a variety of networked settings, including networks of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), traffic networks, wireline and wireless communication networks, and energy systems, among others. These systems are often characterized by the absence of a designated central entity that either has system-wide control or has access to global information. Consequently, control is effected through distributed decision-making and local interactions that rely on limited information. Game-theoretic approaches represent an avenue for designing such protocols. Game theory has seen wide applicability in the social, economic, and engineered sciences in a largely descriptive role. There has been immense recent interest in a prescriptive role [2] that considers designing a game whose equilibria represent the solutions to the control problem of interest [3] , [4] ; consequently, the distributed learning of Nash equilibria assumes immediate relevance in the management of networked systems. Learning in Nash games has seen much study in the last several decades [5] - [8] . In continuous strategy regimes, convex static games find significance in engineered systems, such as communication networks [9] - [12] and signal processing [13] , [14] .
An oft-used assumption in game-theoretic models requires that player payoffs are public knowledge, allowing every player to correctly forecast the choices of his adversaries. As noted by Kirman [15] , a firm's view of the game may be corrupted or misspecified in at least two distinct ways in a Cournot setting where firms decide production levels given a price function: 1) A firm might have a correct description of the price function but an incorrect estimate of its parameters; and 2) it may have an incorrect structure of the price function and incorrectly conclude that prediction errors are a consequence of misspecified parameters. Kirman [15] considered such a learning process, and showed that by observing true demand, the suggested learning process guarantees that the firm strategies converge to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Further inspiration may be drawn from studies by Bischi [16] , [17] , Szidarovsky [18] , [19] , among others [20] , where firms competing in a deterministic Nash-Cournot game learn a parameter of the demand function while playing the game repeatedly. Note that an inherent assumption of a low discount rate is imposed that discounts the future effect of any player's strategies. Analogous questions of optimization and estimation have also been studied by Cooper et al. [21] , who considered a joint process of forecasting and optimization in a regime where the underlying model may be erroneous, demonstrating that the resulting revenues can systematically reduce over time.
When designing protocols for practical engineered systems, particularly in the absence of a centralized controller, the associated parameters of the utility functions may often be misspecified. For instance, in power market models that enlist Nash-Cournot models [22] , [23] , the precise nature of the price function is assumed to be given. Similarly, the expected capacity or availability of renewable generation assets is rarely known a priori. Similarly, when developing distributed protocols for networked UAVs, the prescribed utility functions may rely on agent-specific information that can only be learnt through observations. Faced by such challenges, our goal lies in the development and analysis of general purpose algorithms that combine the computation of Nash equilibria with a learning phase to correct misspecification.
A. Motivation
This research is motivated by the absence of general-purpose distributed schemes with asymptotic convergence and rate guarantees for learning equilibria in the face of imperfect information. Such problems emerge from stochastic generalizations of problems arising in communication networks [10] - [12] , [24] , signal processing [13] , [14] , and power markets [22] . Accordingly, we present two distributed learning schemes in which agents learn their Nash strategy while correcting the misspecification in their payoffs. 1) Stochastic gradient schemes for stochastic Nash games:
In Section II, we present a distributed stochastic approximation framework in which makes two projected gradient updates. Every agent first updates its belief regarding the equilibrium strategy by using the sampled gradient of its payoff function and subsequently updates its belief regarding the misspecified parameter through a similar gradient update. The resulting sequence of equilibrium and parameter estimates are shown to converge to their true counterparts in an almost sure sense.
Notably, we show that the mean-squared error of the equilibrium estimates converges to zero at the optimal rate O(1/K) despite the presence of misspecification where K denotes the number of gradient steps. 2) Iterative fixed-point schemes for stochastic Nash-Cournot games: In Section III, we consider a Cournot regime where aggregate output is unobservable and one parameter of the demand function is misspecified. Under common knowledge, agents develop an estimate of aggregate output and the misspecified price function parameter by observing noisy prices. These estimates allow developing an iterative fixed-point scheme that produces iterates that are shown to converge to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in an almost sure sense. Additionally, firms learn the true parameter in an almost sure sense. The result can be extended to nonlinear price functions.
Remark: We make two remarks before proceeding. a) First, in 1), the learning problem is constructed independently of the computational problem through a set of observations, whereas in 2), the learning is affected by the computational step (akin to multiarmed bandit problems). b) Second, we comment on the sequential two-stage framework for resolving misspecification:
where θ * is to be learnt and x * (θ * ) is the (stochastic) Nash equilibrium, given θ * . Unfortunately, a sequential approach is complicated by several challenges. First, Step 1 needs to be completed in a finite number of iterations, practically impossible for stochastic learning problems. Second, premature termination of
Step 1 leads to an erroneous estimateθ resulting in an incorrect Nash equilibriumx. In fact, in stochastic regimes, such avenues do not lead to asymptotic convergence and at best provide approximate solutions. We observe from preliminary numerics reveal that sequential schemes may perform orders of magnitude worse when compared with iterative fixed-point schemes (see Table III in the Supplementary material). The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define a misspecified stochastic Nash game and present a joint set of stochastic approximation schemes that collectively allow for learning the associated equilibria and resolving misspecification. In Section III, we develop iterative fixed-point schemes in Cournot settings where aggregate output is unobservable. Concluding remarks are provided in Section IV and empirical investigations are included in the Supplementary material. Throughout this paper, x denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x, i.e., x = √ x T x, whereas Π K (u) denotes the Euclidean projection of u onto a set K, i.e., Π K (x) argmin y ∈K x − y . A square matrix H is said to be a P-matrix if every principal minor of H is positive. Similarly, H is a P 0 -matrix if every principal minor of H is nonnegative.
II. GRADIENT-BASED SCHEMES FOR CONVEX GAMES

A. Problem Description, Assumptions, and Background
We consider an N -person stochastic Nash game in which the ith player solves Opt(x −i ):
, θ, and ξ. The associated Nash equilibrium is given by a tuple
) denotes the solution of Opt(x −i ) and under suitable convexity and differentiability requirements [see (A1)], by invoking [25, Th. 7.46 ], x * is a solution to a stochastic variational inequality problem VI(K, F (·; θ * )), where
respectively. It may be recalled that VI(K, F ) requires an x ∈ K satisfying
Our overall goal lies in computing equilibria when θ * is unavailable or misspecified but can be learnt by a possibly stochastic learning problem. 1) Learning Scheme: In this section, we consider the estimation of θ * through the solution of a suitably defined stochastic convex learning problem [26] :
where Θ ⊆ R m is a closed and convex set, η : Λ → R p is a random variable defined on a probability space (Λ, F θ , P θ ), and g : Θ × R p → R is a real-valued learning metric function (such as a regression metric constructed from a set of observations). Consequently, θ * may be learnt through a stochastic gradient scheme of the form for k ≥ 0:
We emphasize that this learning problem is unrelated to the computational process and is built from a set of independently collected.
2) Distributed Computational Scheme: We consider a distributed stochastic approximation scheme where the ith agent employs its belief regarding θ * to take a (stochastic) gradient step for i = 1, . . . , N:
denotes the steplength and sampled gradient used by player i at step k, respectively. While a fully rational agent would always take a best response step, in stochastic settings, the complexity of this step might be significant. In boundedly rational regimes where computational constraints are imposed, an alternative lies in computing other steps, such as the gradient response (cf. [27] and [28] ). An alternative motivation arises from distributed control/optimization settings where a "game" is designed whose equilibrium is a desirable solution to a suitably defined control problem. Here, a distributed protocol for computing an equilibrium can be designed and gradient-based approaches can be adopted (cf. [2] - [4] ). We propose a game-theoretic extension of that developed in [29] and [30] . We may specify our joint simulation-based scheme for learning and computation as follows. 
. . , N, and k = 0.
Step 1:
Step 2: if k >K, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
We now present the main assumptions employed in deriving convergence properties of Algorithm 1. (A1) enforces convexity assumptions that allow for deriving sufficient equilibrium conditions given by VI(X, F ) while the monotonicity requirements on F allow for claiming the existence of a unique equilibrium. Lipschitzian requirements of F aid in deriving subsequent convergence and rate statements. Furthermore, a breadth of learning problems (such as regression, classification, etc., [26] ) are convex. The requirements imposed by (A2) are standard in developing distributed protocols, whereas (A3) imposes assumptions on the conditional first and second moments common in the stochastic approximation literature [31] - [33] .
Assumption 1 (A1): For i = 1, . . . , N, suppose the function f i (x; θ) is convex and continuously differentiable function in x i for every x −i ∈ j =i K j and every θ ∈ Θ. Furthermore, suppose Θ is a closed, convex, and bounded set and for i = 1, . . . , N, K i ⊆ R n i is a nonempty, closed, convex, and bounded set. Furthermore, suppose the following conditions hold. a) For every θ ∈ Θ, F (x; θ) is both strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous in x with constants μ x and L x ; for every θ,
c) The function g(θ) is strongly convex and continuously differentiable with Lipschitz continuous gradients in θ with convexity constant μ θ and Lipschitz constant C θ , respectively; (∇g(θ 1 ) − ∇g(θ 2 )) T (θ 1 − θ 2 ) ≥ μ θ θ 1 − θ 2 2 , and ∇g(θ 1 ) − ∇g(θ 2 ) ≤ C θ θ 1 − θ 2 .
Note that monotone Nash games include stable Nash games, a class of games for which a range of evolutionary dynamics allow for convergence to Nash equilibria [34] , [35] .
Assumption 2 (A2): For i = 1, . . . , N, the ith agent knows only his objective f i , strategy set K i , and the parameter set Θ. Furthermore, the vector x is assumed to be observable.
We define a new probability space
s. for all k, i. To construct distributed schemes requiring no coordination in terms of setting parameters, we allow each agent to independently set steplengths and as long as a suitable relationship between these steplengths holds, convergence follows. Specifically, the ith agent employs a diminishing steplength sequence given by γ k i . Furthermore, we define γ k
Then, we can make the following assumptions on the steplengths of the algorithm.
Assumption 4 (Steplength requirements, A4): Let {γ
A natural concern is whether the rule that relates the steplengths can be implemented in a distributed fashion without coordination. We propose a rule, first suggested by Kannan and Shanbhag [36] , in which every agent chooses a positive integer and the required coordination statement holds. We view this as a protocol that may be employed for developing distributed schemes. The next result ensures that for such a choice, the required assumptions hold [36] .
We state three results (without proof) that will be employed in developing our convergence statements, of which the first two are relatively well-known supermartingale convergence results (cf. [37, Lemma 10, pp. 49-50]) Lemma 2: Let s k be a sequence of nonnegative random vari-
Lemma 3: Let s k , u k , β k , and γ k be nonnegative random variables adapted to σ-algebra 1 − 2μγ + γ 2 L 2 , then for any γ > 0, we have the following:
B. Convergence Analysis
We begin with a contraction statement for the sequence of iterates produced by Algorithm 1.
Lemma 5:
We may now prove our main a.s. convergence result for the sequences {x k } and {θ k }.
Finally, we conclude this section with a nonasymptotic error bound that demonstrates that the joint scheme displays the optimal rate of O(1/K) in mean-squared error.
Let {x k , θ k } be computed via Algorithm 1. Then, there exist constants Q θ and Q x,θ such that the following hold after K iterations:
Remark: Surprisingly, misspecification does not lead to a degeneration in the rate of convergence of the mean-squared error with respect to that for perfectly specified stochastic Nash games (cf. [39] ) but does lead to a worsening of the constant. In addition, the lack of consistency across steplengths leads to a further growth in this constant.
III. ITERATIVE FIXED-POINT SCHEMES FOR MISSPECIFIED NASH-COURNOT GAMES
Inspired by the analysis of misspecified Nash-Cournot games [16] - [19] , [40] , we develop an iterative fixed-point scheme. We introduce the problem in Section III-A and describe and analyze the algorithm in Sections III-B and III-C, respectively. A comparison between gradient and iterative fixed-point schemes is provided in Section III-D and we conclude with an extension to nonlinear prices in Section III-E.
A. Problem Description, Assumptions, and Background
We consider a Nash-Cournot game wherein
the scalar output and cost function associated with firm i, respectively, and K i denotes the strategy set of firm i. Suppose the price function p(X; a * , b * ) is defined as
Note that a * represents the "choke price" at which demand plummets to zero, whereas b * represents the price elasticity of demand. Inspired by Bischi et al. [17] , [40] , we assume that either a * or b * is unknown and firm i's belief of this unknown parameter is denoted by θ i . We also define θ * as the true value of the misspecified parameter of the price function. A natural extension is where both parameters are unknown and this will require two or more observations at each epoch, rather than a single observation of noisy prices. Case 1 (Learning a * ): We assume that firms know b * but are unaware of a * (θ * = a * ); the ith firm harbors a belief on a * denoted by θ i and estimates the aggregate output X by X i , then the ith firm's price estimate and the true noise-corrupted prices are defined as follows:
Case 2 (Learning b * ): Distinct from Case 1, firms know a * and estimate b * as θ i (θ * = b * ) while the true price is corrupted by noise scaled by the aggregate output. Firm i's price estimate and the true prices are defined as follows:
The next assumption formalizes these two cases. Assumption 5 (A5): Either (A5a) or (A5b) holds. (A5a) Firms know b * but not a * (θ * = a * ) and the price is defined by (8) .
(A5b) Firms know a * but not b * (θ * = b * ) and the price is defined by (9) .
Furthermore, the random variable ξ is defined by ξ : Λ → R, (Λ, F θ , P θ ) is the associated probability space and ξ 1 , . . . , ξ k are i.i.d. random variables with mean zero for all k.
Our assumption on costs is a special case of (A1). Assumption 6 (A6): The cost function c i (x i ) is a convex and continuously differentiable function in x i over K i with Lipschitz continuous gradients with constant M i . Furthermore, K 1 , . . . , K N are closed, convex, and bounded sets. Suppose the estimator set Θ is a compact convex set in R + given by
As forwarded by Aumann [41] , the notion of "common knowledge" in game theory extends beyond agents having access to information. We assume that firms cannot observe aggregate output and derive an estimate, relying on the knowledge of the cost functions and strategy sets of their competitors, as assured through a common knowledge assumption. This assumption is often employed in games (see [5] ). Collectively, these two assumptions are captured by (A7).
Assumption 7 (A7): The common knowledge assumption holds with regard to c i (x i ) and K i for i = 1, . . . , N. Furthermore, aggregate output is unobservable.
Several motivating examples exist in the literature detailing common knowledge; these include instances provided in [42] (the barbecue problem) and [43] (the department store problem), among others. While our results are agnostic to applications, it is worth emphasizing that such assumptions often hold when agents need to make their assets and costs public through suitable filings, such as in utility-based regulation (power, gas, water, etc.). This is often the case in regulatory settings (cf. [44, pp. 78-79] ). Common knowledge assumptions immediately hold when a game is designed [2]- [4] and agents can be endowed with the requisite knowledge. A select number of results will rely on boundedness of strategy sets, as specified by (A6).
B. Description of Algorithm
Our goal lies in developing schemes for learning equilibria and misspecified parameters. Unfortunately, since neither the aggregate output nor θ * are observable, gradient/best response schemes cannot be directly implemented. However, under (A7), every firm knows the cost functions and strategy sets of its competitors, allowing for computing the best response of all firms, based on an estimate of θ * and the aggregate. By using the discrepancy between estimated and observed prices, each firm may construct improved estimates of the misspecified parameter. This model, while aligned, with that suggested by Bischi et al. [17] , [40] , enjoys distinctions at several levels; specifically, we allow for constrained problems with nonlinear cost functions with noisy price observations arising from possibly nonlinear price functions. Let
, where x k ij denotes firm i's conjecture of firm j's output at the kth period and X k i denote firm i's estimate of aggregate output. Note that X k i is maintained as strictly positive by assuming that at least one of the strategy sets requires strictly positive output while the true aggregate X k is given by X k 
Subsequently, we show thatθ k i = θ * + ( k j =1 ξ j )/k [see (21) ]. 1) Update of x k +1 i1 , . . . , x k +1 iN : Under (A7), given a sequence { k } ↓ 0, firm i computes a Nash equilibrium, contingent on its choice of θ k +1 i , through a fixed point of the best response map:
2) Update of θ k +1 i : Firm i defines the difference between the price observed at the kth step p(X k ; θ * , ξ k ) and its estimate
where the regularization term k θ k +1 i is introduced to ensure uniqueness of (15) [see Proposition 1] . By invoking the functional form of p(X k +1
, 0), the following holds:
Suppose δ and Δ are lower and upper bounds of Θ, respectively. We may then update θ k +1 i as follows:
Equivalently, we may state the above as
Algorithm 2:
Iterative Fixed-Point and Learning.
Given a sequence { k } ↓ 0 where k > 0 for all k, and γ x ,
} is a solution to the following system:
Step 2. For i = 1, . . . , N, ϑ k +1 i is defined as per (10) or (11) andθ k +1 i is updated as follows:
Step 3. If k >K, stop; else k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
C. Analysis of Noise-Corrupted Iterative Fixed-Point Schemes
In this section, we analyze our iterative fixed-point scheme and partition the discussion as follows.
1) First, we provide a brief discussion as to why the update specified by (15) can be succinctly captured by the solution to a single variational equality problem.
2) Second, we provide a brief sketch of the results to follows.
3) We provide the convergence theory. 1) Equivalence of (15) to a Fixed-Point Problem: First, any best response of a convex optimization problem is equivalent to a solution of a suitable variational inequality problem [45] :
where d i is a convex function in y i over a convex set Y i . In fact, given a collection of functions d i (y i ; y −i ) that are convex in y i over convex sets Y i for all y −i with y −i (y j ) i =j , the coupled best response is equivalent to the solution of a single variational inequality problem [45] :
Finally, any solution to a variational inequality problem is a fixed point of a suitably defined problem where γ is a positive scalar:
By using this avenue, the problem (BR
is the set of coupled fixed-point problems:
where
can be stated as the following fixed-point problem:
Before proceeding, we shed some light on this equivalence. Suppose the root of p k +1
In summary, the coupled best response scheme (15) is equivalent to the coupled fixed-point problem (17)- (18) , which is also equivalent to the variational inequality problem VI(Z, F k +1 + k I). : We first show that the coupled best response scheme given by (15) always admits a unique solution (Proposition 1). Furthermore, each player solves a parametrized form of this system in which the parametrization is shown to be identical [see (21) ]. Theorem 3 shows that the sequence {x k i , θ k i } → {x * , θ * } as k → ∞ in an a.s. sense. This proof relies on showing that θ k i → θ * as k → ∞ in an a.s. sense. Then, if the solution
2) Sketch of Results
where the last equality follows from noting that the correctly specified Nash game has a unique solution.
3) Convergence Theory:
, under either (A5 a) or (A5 b), the solution to (15) is a singleton.
Having shown that the coupled best response scheme has a unique solution, we proceed to show a Lipschitzian property on the solution set of (15) with respect to the parameter θ (Proposition 3). Before that, we provide some preliminary results. The strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the mapping F (x) can be easily shown under (A6).
Lemma 6: Consider the mapping F (x) defined by (1) and suppose (A6) holds. Then, F (x) is a strongly monotone Lipschitz continuous mapping.
This allows for claiming the existence and uniqueness of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium when the price function is affine.
Proposition 2: Consider a Nash-Cournot game in which the ith player solves (Opt(x −i )) and the price is determined by (7) . Furthermore, suppose (A6) holds. Then, the associated Nash-Cournot game admits a unique equilibrium. Now, we state the Lipschitzian property on the solution set of (15) . This proof is inspired by a related result (see [46, Lemma 3] .) Proposition 3: Consider a VI(K, F (·; θ)), where F (x; θ) is strongly monotone in x over K for all θ ∈ Θ, Lipschitz continuous in x for all θ ∈ Θ, and Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. Then, the following hold: a) If x(θ) denotes the solution of VI(K, F (·; θ)), then x(θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all θ ∈ Θ. b) Given an > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of VI(K, F (·; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ and .
If
Based on Lemma 6 and Proposition 3,
We may now show that the iterative fixed-point scheme produces a sequence of iterates that converges almost surely to the true equilibrium and allows for learning the true parameter.
Theorem 3 (Global convergence of iterative fixed-point scheme): Suppose (A5)-(A7) hold. Let {x k i ,θ k i } be computed via Algorithm 2 for i = 1, . . . , N. Then,θ k i → θ * and x k i → x * almost surely for i = 1, . . . , N, where x * is a solution of the variational inequality (2) .
Remark: We emphasize that this scheme requires each agent to effectively solve a suitably defined variational inequality problem, similar to the centralized problem seen in [17] and [40] . Such schemes more closely tied to best response schemes than the gradient-based approaches presented in the previous section. In fact, this particular best response problem requires solving a variational inequality problem with a P-mapping (see proof of Proposition 1), a class of problems that has been studied extensively (cf. [45, Ch. 10 and 11] ).
D. Comparison Between Gradient and Fixed-Point Schemes
To better understand the distinctions between the two schemes, we recap several differences. 1) Assumptions: Gradient-based schemes can accommodate general convex objectives but require that the gradient map be strongly montone and Lipschitz continuous. Furthermore, a general misspecified player objective can be accommodated under suitable assumptions. Iterative fixed-point schemes focus on stochastic Nash-Cournot games (rather than general stochastic Nash games) and require convex costs but allow for either linear or nonlinear inverse demand functions. Notably, players can learn either a * or b * at any given point, whereas a vector of parameters may be learnt in the context of gradient-based algorithms for stochastic Nash games.
2) Nature of algorithm: Gradient-based schemes require that each player computes a projected gradient step in the x and θ space, whereas the iterative best response schemes require that each player solves a parametrized variational inequality and updates a suitably defined average at every step.
3) Convergence and rate statements: The gradient-based schemes allow for claiming a.s. convergence, convergence in mean-squared sense, and derive rate statements. In particular, we show that in such regimes, the rate of convergence is optimal and no degradation arises from misspecification. On the other hand, in the context of the iterative fixed-point schemes, we may show a.s. convergence while rate statements remain a focus of future research.
E. Extension to Nonlinear Price Functions
We now consider a generalization to nonlinear prices defined as follows:
This nonlinear price function has been examined in [36] where a discussion of the strict monotonicity of the associated mapping is presented [see Lemma 7(a)]. Specifically, the equilibrium of the Nash-Cournot game are captured by VI(K, F ), where F (x) is defined as
. (20) In the next result, the mapping F (x) is strongly monotone for all x ∈ K if ∇F (x) is a diagonally dominant matrix for all x ∈ K.
Lemma 7: Consider the mapping F (x) defined in (20) . Suppose (A6) holds, N < 3σ −1 σ −1 and 1 < σ ≤ 3. Then, the following conditions hold. a) F (x) is a strictly monotone mapping over K. b) Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0, then F (x) is a strongly monotone mapping over K. Directly deriving a Lipschitzian statement on F (x; θ) in terms of θ is not easy when the price function has the prescribed nonlinear form; instead, by noting that ∇F (x) is bounded when x is bounded, allows for proving such a statement. Next, we provide a corollary of Proposition 3 where such a property is derived.
Corollary 1: Consider a VI(K, F (·; θ)), where F (x; θ) is strongly monotone in x over K for all θ ∈ Θ, and Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. Also, there exists a constant R > 0, such that ∇F (x; θ) ≤ R for all x ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ. Given an > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of VI(K, F (·; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ and .
Proposition 4: Suppose (A5 a) holds. Consider the mapping F (x) defined in (20) and suppose (A6) holds. Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0 and all
σ −1 and 1 < σ ≤ 3, then the following conditions hold. a) If x(θ) denotes the solution of VI(K, F (.; θ)), then x(θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all θ ∈ Θ. b) Given an > 0, if x(θ, ) denotes the solution of VI(K, F (.; θ) + I), then x(θ, ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ and . We may now show that the fixed-point problem yields a unique solution.
Proposition 5: Suppose (A6) and (A7) hold. Let the price be given by (19) . If N < 3σ −1 σ −1 and 1 < σ ≤ 3, then given p k (ξ k ) and {θ k i } N i=1 , the solution to (15) is a singleton. By leveraging Propositions 4 and 5, the convergence of the iterative fixed-point scheme can be claimed under the caveat that the aggregate output is always bounded away from zero, as stated by the next result, whose proof is similar to Theorem 3 and is omitted.
Corollary 2: Suppose (A6) and (A7) hold. Suppose X ≥ η for some η > 0 and all x ∈ K, where X = N i=1 x i . Let {x k i ,θ k i } be computed via Algorithm 2 for i = 1, . . . , N. Suppose a unique solution to the fixed-point problem (15) can be obtained, given p k (ξ k ) and {θ k i } N i=1 for each k ≥ 0. Then, θ k i → θ * almost surely for i = 1, . . . , N and x k i → x * almost surely for i = 1, . . . , N, where x * is a solution of the variational inequality (2) .
We conclude this section with an observation. If one used a more widely used estimation technique, such as a least-squares estimation, then it remains unclear if almost sure convergence statements can always be claimed since least-squares estimators generally converge in a weaker sense while stronger statements may be available for linear regression (see [47] ). In effect, a scheme that combines a least-squares estimation technique with a strategy update, while convergent, may not possess desirable almost sure convergence properties. While, we examine nonlinear Nash-Cournot games in this section, we also show that such claims hold for more general aggregative Nash games. However, it should be emphasized that extending this avenue to Nash games where the associated variational map is nonmonotone may lead to challenges. In particular, what are perfectly reasonable schemes for a subclass of Nash games may not be supported by similar asymptotic guarantees when the structural properties of the problem do not satisfy some key requirements.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Nash games, a broadly applicable paradigm for modeling strategic interactions in noncooperative settings, have emerged as immensely useful in the context of distributed control problems. Yet, the development of distributed protocols for learning equilibria may be complicated by the following challenges.
1) Agents may have an incomplete specification of payoffs.
2) Agents may be unavailable to observe the actions of their counterparts.
3) Observations may be corrupted by noise. Accordingly, this paper is motivated by developing schemes for learning equilibria and resolving misspecification (such as in the price functions). We consider two specific settings as part of our investigation and apply these techniques on a class of networked Nash-Cournot games. First, we consider convex static stochastic Nash games characterized by a suitable monotonicity property in which agent payoffs are parameterized by a misspecified vector. We consider a framework that combines (stochastic) gradient steps with a stochastic approximation step that attempts to learn the parameter. In such settings, we provide asymptotic statements that show that agents may learn equilibria and the true parameters in an almost sure sense. In addition, we provide nonasymptotic error bounds that demonstrate that the rate of convergence is not impaired by the presence of learning. Second, we refine our statements to a Cournot regime where we assume common knowledge holds but aggregate output is unobservable. In such a setting, we construct a learning scheme in which firms maintain a belief of the aggregate output and the misspecified price function parameter. After each step, these beliefs are updated by employ fixed-point steps and by leveraging the disparity between estimated and (noisy) observed prices. We proceed to show that in the limit, every firm learns the true Nash-Cournot equilibrium strategy in an almost sure sense. Additionally, every firm learns the correct value of the misspecified parameter in an almost sure sense. Yet much remains to be studied, including weakening monotonicity requirements on the map and boundedness requirements on the strategy sets. It also remains to be investigated as to whether learning can allow for weakening the common knowledge assumption.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: It suffices to show that given p(X k ; θ * , ξ k ) and {θ k i } N i=1 , the variational inequality VI(Z, F k +1 + k I) has a unique solution for each i. Now, for simplicity, we ignore the superscript k for all variables. Given p,θ i , i, and k, let H(z i ) denote the Jacobian matrix ∇F (z i ) of F at z i ∈ Z. We will proceed to show that H(z i ) is a Pmatrix for all z i ∈ Z in part (a) and a P 0 -matrix for all z i ∈ Z in part (b), where Z ⊂ Z and Z is a rectangle. Then, by invoking [45, Proposition 3.5.9], the associated mapping F is P-mapping on Z in part (a) and a P 0 -mapping on Z in part (b). Consequently, by [45, Th. 3.5.15] , the regularized variational inequality VI(Z, F k +1 + k I) has a unique solution in both parts (a) and (b). Specifically, we employ a rectangular Z defined as
, where e denotes the column of ones in R N , E i is an N × N diagonal matrix with c j (x ij ) as its jth diagonal entry. Since, the nonnegativity of c j (x ij ) follows from the convexity of costs, E i is a nonnegative diagonal matrix and is therefore positive semidefinite. Recall that the sum of a diagonal positive semidefinite matrix and a P-matrix is a P-matrix and it suffices to show that H i is a P-matrix when E i = 0. This amounts to showing that the principal minors of H are positive.
Since A i and D are P-matrices, we only consider the principal submatrix H α of H i , where α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set and H α is given by
k +1 e n α , C α = −b * ( e n α ) T , and I n α and e n α denote the identity matrix and the column of ones in R n α ×n α and R n α , respectively, with n α = |α|. Since
(b) Analogous to our approach for (a), we consider a matrix H i , given by H i = ∇F (z i ). Then,
. , x iN ) T , e denotes the column of ones in R N , and E i is an N × N diagonal matrix with c j (x ij ) as its jth diagonal entry. Recall that the sum of a diagonal positive semidefinite matrix and a P 0 -matrix is a P 0 -matrix. As in (a), it suffices to show that H is a P 0 -matrix when E i = 0.
Since A i and D i are P 0 -matrices, we restrict our attention to the principal submatrix H α of H i , where α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set, and H α is given by
, C α =b i (e n α ) T , and I n α and e n α denote the identity matrix and the column of ones in R n α ×n α and R n α , respectively, with n α = |α|. Then, the following hold: 1) If b i = 0, then A α = 0 and C α = 0, which implies det(H α ) = 0; 2) Ifb i > 0, then A −1 α = 1 b i (I n α − 1 n α +1 e n α (e n α ) T ). So, we have
(e n α ) T I n α − 1 n α + 1 e n α (e n α ) T × (x α + (e T x i )e n α )
((e n α ) T − n α n α + 1 e n α ) T (x α + (e T x i )e n α ) = 1 (k + 1)(n α + 1) (e n α ) T x α + n α (e T x i ) .
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 6, the associated variational inequality VI(K, F ) has a strongly monotone mapping F (x) over K. Consequently, VI(K, F ) admits a unique solution [45] .
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose k ≥ 0. At the kth iteration,p k i is a function ofθ k +1 i , which is a function ofθ k i . Consequently, the fixed-point problem (15) is a function ofθ k i . Since (15) has a unique solution (Proposition 1), it follows that x i,· = x j,· for i = j and x k ij = x k j j . Therefore, Given p(X k ; θ * , ξ k ) and
for all i, j. Thus, for all k ≥ 0 and all i, we have that
Since for all k ≥ 0 and all i,
(a * − p(X k ; θ * , ξ k ))/X k i , under (A5b).
we have ϑ k i = θ * + ξ k for all i. As a result, after k iterative fixed-point steps, we obtain k samples {θ * + ξ 1 , . . . , θ * + ξ k } of the estimated parameter. Since for all k ≥ 0 and all i,
, the sample mean of the estimated parameter is given byθ k i , i.e.,
Therefore,θ k i → θ * a.s. as k → ∞, which implies by the boundedness of {θ k i } that for all i 
Since c i (x i ) is a convex function in x i for all i, J 1 is a positive semidefinite matrix. J 2 , compactly stated as 2b * σX σ −1 ee T , is also a positive semidefinite matrix. As a consequence, positive definiteness of ∇F (x) follows from the diagonal dominance of the following matrix:
By a minor rearrangement, it suffices to show the diagonal dominance of the following: Proof of Proposition 4: By Lemma 7, F (x; θ) is a strongly monotone mapping over K for all θ ∈ Θ. By the definition of F , F (x; θ) is Lipschitz continuous in θ for all x ∈ K. By the definition of ∇F and boundedness of x ∈ K, ∇F (x; θ) is bounded for x ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ. Then, the conclusion follows from Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 5: Given p,θ i , i, and k, let H(z i ) denote the Jacobian matrix ∇F (z i ) of the mapping F at z i ∈ Z. Then, as in Proposition 1, it suffices to show that H(z i ) is a P-matrix for all z i ∈ Z. Given z i ∈ Z, let H = H(z i ). Then,
k +1 e, C i = −σb * (X i ) σ −1 e T , and D = 1 k +1 , where X i = N j =1 x ij , x i = (x 11 , . . . , x 1N ) T , and E i is an N × N diagonal matrix with c j (x ij ) as its jth diagonal entry. It suffices to show that H is a P-matrix when E i = 0.
If N < 3σ −1 σ −1 , then A i is positive semidefinite by Lemma 7. Therefore, we only consider the principal submatrix H α of H, where α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} is a nonempty index set, and H α ( A α C α B α D ), where A α = σb * (X i ) σ −1 [I n α + e n α (e n α ) T ] + σ(σ − 1)b * (X i ) σ −2 x α (e n α ) T , B α = − 1 k +1 e n α , C α = −σb * (X i ) σ −1 (e n α ) T , and I n α and e n α denote the identity matrix and the column of ones in R n α ×n α and R n α , respectively, with n α = |α|. Since B α D −1 C α = 1 k + 1 e n α (k + 1)σb * (X i ) σ −1 (e n α ) T = σb * (X i ) σ −1 e n α (e n α ) T it follows that A α − B α D −1 C α = σb * (X i ) σ −1 I n α + σ(σ − 1)b * (X i ) σ −2 x α (e n α ) T , which is a sum of a diagonal positive definite matrix and a P 0 -matrix, and thus is a P-matrix. Therefore, det(H α ) = det(D) det(A α − B α D −1 C α ) > 0 for all α ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with α = ∅, which implies that H is a P-matrix.
